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I. OVERVIEW
Concurrency is a legislatively-enacted growth management tool for
ensuring the availability of adequate public facilities and services to
accommodate development. The foundation for a legally viable concurrency
system is the formulation and implementation of a capital improvements
plan for delivering essential public facilities in a timely manner by linking
the approval of new development to the current and future availability of
adequate public facilities. Ideally, concurrency regulations should seek to
avoid the necessity for any moratoria on development by ensuring that both
existing and planned public facilities are available as needed in light of a

* Senior Partner at Law Offices of Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff& Sitterson,
PA. located at SunTrust Financial Centre, 401 E. Jackson Street, Suite 2200, Tampa, FL 33602.
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community's growth. Currently, there are seven mandatory facilities which
are subject to concurrency requirements as required by Chapter 163, Part
II, Florida Statutes.' These mandatory facilities for which local
governments are required to adopt level of service (LOS) standards include
roads, sanitary sewer, solid waste, drainage, potable water, parks, and mass
transit! A voluntary eighth public facility of education is discussed below.
A capital improvements program must be set forth in the local
government's comprehensive plan and establish both LOS standards for the
facilities subject to concurrency and present the means for meeting the LOS
standards.3 Development impacts that result in service levels below the
adopted LOS standards will not be allowed.
II. SCHOOL CONCURRENCY MORATORIA

On October 2, 2000, the City of Westin disapproved Swan Lake's
zoning because it would add forty kids to schools that are allegedly
inadequate. In contrast to the powers delegated to the school board, local
governments lack any general authority to control, operate, or regulate
public schools.4 However, a local government's planning decisions
regarding development do have a direct and significant impact on the public
school system. Local governments are required to adopt a local
comprehensive plan as a blueprint for future development. Additionally,
they are responsible for enacting local land development regulations to
achieve the goals of the local comprehensive plan. Comprehensive plans are
required to be reliable, consistent, certain, and meaningful under Florida
law.' For a local government to establish a public school concurrency
system, the local government must have the ability to operate public
facilities, adopt a financially feasible capital improvements plan for
delivering such facilities, and establish a LOS standard for its schools. Most
importantly, the local government must have the ability to control the

1. FLA.
2. Id.

STAT. §

163.3180 (I)(a) (Supp. 1996).

3. LOS is a basic planning concept used to reflect to what degree a public facility will be
needed or required per unit of growth or development in a community. FLA. ADNuN. CODE ANN.
R. 9J-5.003(61) (2000).
4. While a local government has neither the authority nor the ability to control the funding,
construction, or operation of public schools managed on a county-wide basis by the independent

school boards, local governments do collect property taxes and development impact fees which
constitute a portion of the financing for the county education system.
5. "The basic format of the criteria for each element requires the identification of available
data, analysis of such data, and preparation of goals, objectives and policies supported by data and
analysis to accomplish desired ends." FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 9J-5.001(8) (2000).
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allocation of capacity for the schools while eliminating existing deficiencies
in the system - all in conjunction with the school board. In sum, the
capital facilities element must demonstrate that the local government will
meet both existing and future capacity needs."
A valid comprehensive plan responds appropriately to available data by
formulating meaningful standards, principles, guidelines, goals, objectives,
and policies! Planning is preparation. The essence of a plan is the
identification of likely circumstances and events that may occur during a
reasonable time in the future and the development of actions that respond
both meaningfully and appropriately to such events.9 The local
comprehensive plan is the principal instrument for regulating land use in
Florida. It is implemented through adopting land development regulations
consistent with the plan elements. Ultimately, any and all development,
whether private or public, approved by local governments must be
consistent with the adopted local plan.
Florida Statute section 163.3180 now provides complex local
government requirements when the government seeks to impose a public
school concurrency requirement."0 One requirement is the statute's study
requirement which is intended to provide a blueprint of how the local
government and the school board will achieve and maintain the established
LOS standard and accomplish the necessary intergovernmental
coordination. Because only local governments control development
approvals and only school boards control the financing and operation of
public schools, it is vital to the successful adoption of school concurrency
that all the powers and responsibilities of the involved authorities be
specifically delineated and agreed upon.
In addition to preparing a study, a local government which elects to
extend concurrency to public schools must amend the capital improvements
element of its local comprehensive plan to indicate: (1)where and when the
local government will provide the new schools needed to serve its projected
growth; (2) the cost of the proposed new schools; (3) the projected revenue
sources to fund the new schools; (4) the appropriate policies for ensuring
that adequate schools will be available concurrent with the impact of future
development; and (5) that the capital improvement element, as amended,

6. See FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3180(lXb), .3177(3Xa) (Supp. 1996).
7. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 9J-5.016(3)(bXI).
8. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(OXe) (Supp. 1996).

9. Recommended Order, DOAH Case Nos. 91-6138GM and 97-1875, para. 136, p. 37
(Oct. 8, 1997) (on file with author).
10. See also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 9J-5.0055(2Xb).
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is internally consistent and coordinated with each of the other elements of
the local comprehensive plan."
If a public school concurrency requirement is adopted, the school must
adhere to the same laws as a facility statutorily subject to concurrency.
Therefore, LOS standards for schools must be set forth in the capital
improvements element of the local comprehensive plan. 2 However, local
governments do not have the authority to set LOS standards for public
schools. Only LOS standards set by the school board, which establish what
capacity is acceptable for school facilities, are binding. All adopted LOS
standards must be achievable and maintainable throughout the planning
period covered by the local comprehensive plan. 3 If the LOS standard
adopted is neither met nor maintained, the comprehensive plan is deficient,
and the
school concurrency system will not be in compliance with state
14
law.
Yet, many of the following questions are left unanswered by the laws
permitting local governments to adopt school concurrency: (1) What are
the LOS standards to be applied? (2) In what manner should the LOS
standards be applied? (3) Should the LOS standards be applied on a
county-wide basis? (4) Should the LOS standards be applied by some other
measure, instead of on a county-wide basis? (5) What measure of service
should be used in establishing the LOS standards? (6) How can a projection
be done of the numbers of new students? and, (7) How can a projection be
done of the location of those new students?" These are questions which
remain unanswered and which must be addressed by any local government
that elects to extend concurrency to public schools.
Florida Statute section 163.3180 also requires the inclusion of a
financially feasible public school capital facilities program in the capital

I1. See generally Thomas G. Pelham, Esq., The Legal and Practical Implications and
Difficulties of School Concurrency (on file with author).
12. See FLA. STAT. § 163.31 80(I(Xb)I (Supp. 1996).
13. A valid plan must also address and provide a reasonable time period to achieve the goals
of the public school's facility element. Rule 9.-5, requires both a five- and a ten-year plan
addressing the means for meeting and maintaining LOS standards, and for evaluating the progress
ofconcurrency. FLA. AD IN. CODE ANN. R. 9J-5.005(4) (2000). First, there is the five-year period
to begin subsequent to the adoption of a concurrency plan. For a capital improvement element, this
initial five-year period is the minimum period required by statute. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(3XaXI)
(Supp. 1996). The second plan must span at least ten years in total. FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. R.
9J-5.005(4).
14. See supra note 9, Recommended Order, paras. 135, 142, pp. 47-52.
15. In Broward County, the LOS was never challenged per se. Concurrency was never
implemented in accordance with the statute because the county failed to prove how it could meet
and support the LOS measures adopted.
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improvements element of the local comprehensive plan. 16 In 1998, the
Florida Legislature stiffened and clarified this requirement. 7 Most critically,
the capital facilities program must demonstrate how the local government
will achieve and maintain the adopted LOS standard.' 8 Among other
problems faced by the various authorities attempting to manage growth and
prevent overcrowding are the deficiencies which currently abound in the
public school system. And, how can the current classroom deficits and
unmet needs be addressed? How will the school board react or cope with
its loss of authority? How will the school board react or cope with the
transition to shared authority and responsibility for managing the school
system?
In 1997, Broward County's school concurrency system was determined
through land use litigation to be inconsistent with its comprehensive plan.
Subsequent legislation has more clearly defined the requirements to enforce
school concurrency requirements, but challenges and questions persist.
Recent attempts in 1999 and 2000 to impose school concurrency in
Broward County found inconsistencies with its comprehensive plan, and a
settlement agreement concluded those attempts in September 2000.
III.

"GiVINGS" OF GOVERNMENT OFFSETrING AWARDS MADE FOR
TAKINGS

In Hendlerv. UnitedStates, 9 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an owner suffered $185,000 in damages caused by the United States
government's clean up of his property and that of others nearby, without
his permission. These damages were more than offset by benefits to the
owner of $280,000 in characterization expenses," $195,000 in investigation
to clean up, and $244,000 of remediation of contamination of property by
the United States government.' Given the Court's holding in Hendler,one
must wonder whether the giving of new zonings and roads nearby will

offset awards made for takings in the future?

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(I)(b)1 (Supp. 1996).
See id
Id. § 163.3180(l)(b).
Hendler v. U.S., 175 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Id at 1381.
Id
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IV. PROTECTING EXTRAORDINARILY

GREAT PUBLIC INTERESTS: WILL
CONCURRENCY MORATORIA BE SUSTAINABLE?

In City of St. Petersburgv. Bowen, 2 the Bowen court addressed the
issue of whether a one-year taking of all rights to lease apartments is a
compensable taking, and if the taking is for a commendable purpose, will
such purpose affect the right to be compensated?23 In Bowen, a Nuisance
Abatement Board (NAB) order that closed an apartment complex for one
year was found to constitute a taking.24 The Bowen court noted that the

remedy chosen by the NAB was among the most invasive methods of
abating a purported nuisance, in this case, drug dealing.2" The Bowen court
considered the NAB action in light of the Supreme Court decision in Lucas
v. South CarolinaCoastal Council.26 The Bowen court found that there
was no common law nuisance doctrine prohibiting the use of a building for
rental purposes and concluded that the particular remedy chosen by the
NAB constituted a temporary taking." In the recent similar case of City of
St. Petersburgv. Kablinger,28 the Second District Court of Appeals held
that the government action constituted a temporary taking and certified its
holding as being in conflict with City ofMiami v. Keshbro.29
Although Bowen andKablingerfavor landowners' interests, other cases
have reached the opposite outcome when weighing the public interests
served by government action. For example, the Keshbro court,3" like the
Bowen court, held that property owners must be compensated when a
government entity validly exercises its power to abate nuisances, if such
exercise deprives the owners, at least temporarily, of all economic use of
their property. 3 However, the Keshbro court determined that compensation
to the owners was not required as a result of the actions of the City of
Miami (City) and the City of Miami Nuisance Abatement Board (Board).32
In Kesbro, the Board entered an order closing the entire Stardust Motel
(Motel) for six months during 1997 in an effort to terminate a nuisance, of
22. City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen, 675 So. 2d 626 (2d DCA), review denied, 680 So. 2d
421 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1130 (1997).
23. Id. at 629.
24. Id at 631.
25. Id. at 629.
26. Id at 630 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
27. d at631.
28. City of St. Petersburg v. Kablinger, 730 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
29. City of Miami v. Keshbro, 717 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), review granted,729 So.
2d 392 (Fla. 1999); Kablinger,730 So. 2d at 410.
30. Keshbro, 717 So. 2d at 601.
31. Id. at603.
32. Id
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drug and prostitution related activities.33 The City and the Board then
sought, and obtained, an injunction from the circuit court enforcing the
closure order. 3' The owners alleged the Board's complete closure
constituted a temporary taking depriving them of all economic use of their
property, thus entitling them to compensation from the City.35 The owners
cited to Lucas and Bowen in support of their argument that a regulatory
taking requires compensation unless the proscribed use was not part of the
owner's title upon acquisition.36 The owners contended that use as a motel
was a permitted use both when the Motel was purchased and at the time of
the Board's order.37
The order and injunction did not constitute a taking because the
background principles of nuisance and property law prohibit using the
Motel as it was being used at the time the order was entered.3S The Keshbro
court, like the Bowen court, considered the Board's action in light of
Lucas, but came to the opposite conclusion.39 The Keshbro court
acknowledged that the Board's action precluded the only economically
viable use of the property, noting the Motel's extensive history upon which
the orders were based.40
The Keshbro court determined that the Motel was, in reality, operating
as a brothel and a drug house, and that the proscribed activities were
"inextricably intertwined" with the Motel.4 ' The Keshbro court found that
it was necessary to bar access to the Motel operations as a whole to
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id at 604-05.
Id. at 602.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id. The City and the Board rely upon the common law action for public nuisance as it

was expressed in Lucas, requiring that a governmental entity
must identify background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit
the uses [the owner] now intends in the circumstances in which the property is
presently found. Only on this showing can the State fairly claim that, in
proscribing all such beneficial uses, the [governmental regulation] is taking
nothing.
See id. at 603 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).

39. Id at 602-04.
40. Id. In 1992, the Board had ordered the Motel closed in an effort to curtail illicit activity

on the property. The Motel was reopened in 1993, until subsequent criminal events led to a second
Board hearing in 1996-97. Id. The Board closed six motel rooms for six months in an effort to
terminate the nuisance, yet drug and prostitution related activities continued. Id. Another seven
rooms were closed, until continued violations resulted in the Board order at issue. Id
41- Id at &4.
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preclude such activity.42 The Keshbro court concluded that the illicit uses
proscribed by the order were not a part of the owner's title, or bundle of
rights, at the time the owners acquired the Motel, as such uses have no
"tradition of protection at common law."' 3 Therefore, the City was not
required to compensate the owners." Finally, the Keshbro court
distinguished Keshbro from Bowen on the basis that the Bowen court did
not discuss the "inextricable intertwining" of proscribed uses with other
valid uses in its decision.45 Ultimately, the Keshbro court reversed the grant
of summary judgment in favor of the owners and remanded the matter for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.'
V. BALANCING GREAT PUBLIC INTERESTS AGAINST GREAT PRIVATE

INTERESTS
In Vesta Fire Insurance Corp. v. Florida,47 the Eleventh Circuit
discussed whether there is a taking of profits when insurance companies are
required to stay in an unprofitable residential insurance pool.4" After
Hurricane Andrew in 1992, insurance companies began canceling or
refusing to renew residential line insurance policies in Florida to reduce
their exposure to such catastrophes.49 The Vesta court noted that, fearing
the unavailability of insurance, the Florida Legislature passed the
Moratorium Statute, the Moratorium Phaseout Statute, and the Florida
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund. The Moratorium Statute temporarily
prohibited the nonrenewal and cancellation of residential line insurance
policies for reasons related to the risk of hurricane damage. The
Moratorium Phaseout Statute provided, in part, that no insurer could cancel
or decline to renew more than five percent of its residential policies in
Florida. Also, the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund required insurers to
pay annual premiums that were intended to provide reinsurance to
insurance companies doing business in Florida.50

42. Id.
43. Id at 605 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016).
44. Id. at 604-05.
45. Id at 604 n.8. Further, it is interesting to note that the Motel in Keshbro was closed for
a period of six months, following earlier hearings, closings, and mitigation by the Board. Id. at
602. In Bowen, the property was closed for one year. Bowen, 675 So. 2d at 628. Additionally, in
Keshbro, the property closed was a hotel, while in Bowen it was an apartment complex.
46. Keshbro, 717 So. 2d at 605.
47. Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Fla., 141 F.3d 1427 (1Ith Cir. 1998).
48. Id.at 1430.
49. Id.at 1429.

(describing the statutes enacted by the Legislature).
50. Id.

20011
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In Vesta, the plaintiff insurance companies sued, claiming the referenced
legislation violated the Due Process, Taking and Contract Clauses of the
United States Constitution." The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's
ruling granting the Florida Insurance Commissioner's motion for summary
judgment on the Contract Clause and substantive due process claims.52 The
Vesta court determined that the government's conduct did not rise to the
level of a per se taking because "neither a physical invasion nor a denial of
allbeneficial use of 'property"' was shown.53 Although the Eleventh Circuit
did not decide the regulatory takings issue, the Vesta court adopted the
standard used by the Supreme Court in Connelly v. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp.54 The Vesta court delineated three critical factors for
identifying a regulatory taking: (1) the economic impact of the challenged
statute on the plaintiff; (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with
investment-backed expectations; and (3) the nature of the challenged
action."
The trial court found that the extent of economic impact remained a
material fact to be determined and did not address plaintiffs' allegation that
limitations on their withdrawal from the Florida market interfered with their
investment-backed expectations." However, the Vesta court did note the
similarity between the instant case and cases which prohibit the enactment
of statutes that do not solely regulate the conditions of doing business, but
actually, require the doing of business." The Vesta court pointed out that
"[w]hile [a state's] police power may limit and restrict the uses to which an
owner may put his property, it may not compel him to use such property for
a particular purpose if he prefers to abandon such a use thereof.""8
Furthermore, the Vesta court explained that "[i]nterference with
investment-backed expectations occurs when an inadequate history of
similar government regulation exists: where the earlier regulation does not
provide companies with sufficient notice that they may be subject to the
new or additional regulation."59

51. Id at 1429-30.
52. Id at 1434.

53. Id. at 1431 (emphasis in the original). This Article will discuss only the reasoning and
analysis of the takings claim.
54. Connelly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 106 S.Ct. 1018, 1026 (1986).
55. Vesta, 141 F.3d. at 1431.
56. Id.at 1432.
57. Id.

58. Id (quoting Dep't of Pub. Works v. City of San Diego, 10 P.2d 102, 105 (Cal. Ct. App.
1932)).
59. Id.
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Finally, the Vesta court analyzed the nature of the government action,
stressing that when important public interests are served, such as protecting
the Florida real estate market, a taking is less likely to have occurred. ° The
Vesta court remanded this issue for the necessary study of competing
interests.6 '
VI. WILL CONCURRENCY MORATORIA ADVANCE SUBSTANTIAL

LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS?

The Supreme Court, in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes' upheld
the $1.45 million verdict for a developer who was denied equal protection
and due process rights.63 The City of Monterey decision provides insight
into the applicability of Dolan v. City ofTigard," and establishes the right
to ajury trial in certain limited instances for a plaintiffasserting a regulatory
takings claim in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.65
Del Monte, a landowner, sought to develop its 37.6 acre parcel of
waterfront property located in Monterey, California.' In City ofMonterey,
the oceanfront parcel formerly served as a petroleum tank farm, though it
was zoned for approximately one thousand homes. 7 Although the property
was zoned for greater density, Del Monte submitted a plan to the City of
Monterey Planning Commission (the Commission) for the development of
only 344 units on the property.68 The Commission rejected Del Monte's
plan and refused to grant a permit, but indicated that a proposal for 264
units would be more favorably considered." Thereafter, Del Monte
resubmitted a plan for development contemplating the suggested 264
units."' Again, the Commission denied Del Monte's application, this time
asserting that a reduction to 224 units would be favorably received by the
Commission."' Once again, Del Monte revised and amended its plan to
propose a 224-unit development. The Commission rejected the plan again.'
60.
1242-43
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 1433 (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232,
(1987)).
Id at 1434.
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
Id
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
DelMonte, 526 U.S. at 694.
Id
Id. at 695.
Id.
Id at 696.
Id.
Id.

72. Id.

20011
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After the third denial, Del Monte appealed to the City Council and the
City Council ordered the Commission to reconsider Del Monte's plan, with
the condition that the number of proposed units be limited to 190. 7 Despite
the revised plan, the City Council's order for the Commission to reconsider,
and the significant reduction in the proposed units from the original 344 to
190; the Commission rejected Del Monte's proposal. 74 Del Monte again
appealed to the City Council for assistance." In response, the City Council
proposed that Del Monte be allowed to develop the property with certain
restrictions. 76 Among them, first, that the sand dunes on the landward third
of the property remain untouched." Second, that a public beach, parking,
and roads be dedicated on the seaward third of the property. 7 And third,
that the middle third of the property be set aside for habitat restoration for
an endangered species known as the Smith's Blue Butterfly. Even though,
no live specimen had actually been located on the property." Del Monte
complied and submitted four alternative site plans taking into consideration
the restrictions and limiting the development to 190 units.'
The Commission staff recommended that the proposal be approved."'
Despite the fact that only 5.1 of the 37.6 acres would be used for residential
development, the City Council rejected the final plan.' After five years of
planning, five formal decisions by city agencies, and the submission of
nineteen different site plans; Del Monte sold the property for more than it
paid many years before, to the State of California. Del Monte subsequently
sued the City of Monterey (the City) in federal district court pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of due process and equal protection and
alleging an unconstitutional regulatory taking without compensation. 3
Although a federal judge ruled against Del Monte on the due process
theory, the jury found a temporary taking and a denial of equal protection
and found that the rationale of protecting the Smith's Blue Butterfly failed
to advance a substantial legitimate governmental interest." The jury
awarded Del Monte $1.45 million in damages, and though the City
73. Id
74. Id.
75. Id.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 696-98.
Id at 697.
Id.
Idaat698.
Id at 696.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 699.

262
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appealed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed8 5 The
City then persuaded the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari,
arguing that Del Monte was not entitled to a jury trial on liability.'
The Supreme Court noted that the city attorney had not objected to
potentially objectionable jury instructions about what constitutes a
government failure to advance a legitimate governmental interest.8 For
example, should Agins v. Tiburon8 be revisited nineteen years later and
should such "failure to advance" be treated as a due process (non-jury)
matter rather than a takings case for the jury?
On a separate note, the Court's decision seemingly limited Dolan's
"rough proportionality" standard to land dedications for public purposes. 9
The Court found that the "rough proportionality" test was not designed to
address a denial of development, but qualified its rejection of the Dolantest
by commenting that the jury was never instructed to apply that test.90
Therefore, the impact and importance of Dolan was not totally
compromised. 9' Instead ofrejectioning the Dolantest, the Court noted that
the question of whether a land use decision substantially advances a
legitimate public interest is a mixed question of fact and law. The Court
stated that the narrow question submitted to the jury was whether, when
viewed in light of the context and protracted history of the development
application process, the City's decision to reject a particular development
plan bore a "reasonable relationship" to its proffered justifications for
denying a permit.92 The Court found this question was essentially factbound in nature, and therefore, was properly submitted to a jury. 93
Current case law seems to represent ajudicial trend to limit government
actions like concurrency enforcement by: (a) a few per se or categorical
rights that allow landowners to recover from affected governments where,
for example, there was a physical invasion or where all economic use was
lost due to government regulations; (b) a resistance to the conclusion that
"government can do no wrong," or that admittedly, laudable adequate
public facility discipline or other purposes can be fulfilled without careful
review of the effects on landowners; and (c) the insulation of governments

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 701.
Id at 702.
Id at 704-05.
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
Del Monte, 526 U.S. at 703.
Id.
Id at 720-21.
Id. at 721.

93. Id at 722.
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from liability where the government demonstrates, under prior law, the
proposed use was a "nuisance," even if a landowner lost all use.
VII. CONCURRENCY ENFORCEMENT POWER AND THE FUTURE
OF ITS ENFORCEMENT

A. Legal Challenges Limit ConcurrencyEnforcement
Replacing concurrency moratoria, over the next decade's evolution, will
require online performance, prepayment standards, and requirements that
lead to automatic approval at the click of a mouse. Resource uses,
replacements and substitutions will be programmed in, along with flex hour
and transit incentives, efficient service provision incentives, and capacity
reservations. There will be annual "use it or lose it" safeguards against
hoarding rationed capacities.
Current land use exactions and mitigations will be replaced. Impact fees,
user charges, development of regional impact exactions and mitigations,
and special assessments will yield to regional resource consumption
charges, recycling credits, in-kind contributions, technology and resource
exchanges, public/private partnerships, grants, subsidies, offsets, and
sustainable resource incentives.
'Concurrency-proof' zones" will evolve from "concurrency moratoria,"
where required road, water, sewer, drainage, and other mandatory public
facilities are inadequate. Development will be focused where capacity
remains or can be inexpensively added. State law needs to require
development regulations that detail how, when, and at what price
development will be allowed, or implement current law as to how
development can be allowed including when, at what price, and how long
approval will be good for.
Development assessments need to include: (a) credits for wetlands,
species' habitats, green space, and excess resource protection; (b) credits
for internal trip capture, job centers, and new water sources;
(c) infrastructure offsets for refining the examination of true impacts of a
development, such as where retail businesses, offices, and jobs that are
within walking or transit distance, bike paths to schools, and
accommodating proposed development; and (d) traditional pricing with
credit for ten years of future taxes and half of all those paid the last forty
years.
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B. Governments Must EncourageConcurrencyEffectiveness
Governments need to pay developers in cash and kind, transfer

development rights to developers and expedite approval of their permits in
order to discourage urban sprawl, and efficiently deliver services. For
example, the government purchased development rights in the Green
Swamp in 1996. In Albuquerque, New Mexico, those who develop in the
favored urban growth areas where there are existing facilities get an
expedited permit within 120 days. Approval is presumed in favored areas
of Portland, Oregon. And, density bonuses for greater density are given in
Miami Beach, Minneapolis and Seattle. Florida now has a few expedited
ninety day permit programs for those companies bringing the State five
hundred or more high-paying jobs (115% of the average or better).94
Similar programs must encourage compact urban development.
VIII. LIMITS ON CONCURRENCY MORATORIA:
THE BERT J. HARRIS, JR. PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION ACT
OF 1995
The Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act (Act), 9
creates a new cause of action for an aggrieved property owner who
demonstrates that governmental action occurring after May 11, 1995
"inordinately burdens" his property." Under the Act, a landowner must
show with an appraisal, inordinate limitations or restrictions on investmentbacked expectations, or disproportionate burdens that should be borne by
the public as a whole. 97
Over the next decade when the State of Florida cannot balance sensitive
area needs, and non-building purchase attempts fail, condemning of
development rights will lead to judicial verdicts in the form of cash awards,
development rights exchanges, or entitlements. Special land use courts
should be created for this purpose. The State of Florida will pay for their
compensable takings if they deny all or substantially all development
entitlements or use, or inordinately burden those entitlements under
Florida's 1995 property rights law.
Based on Florida's historic response to its growing pains within ten
years, Florida will see the creation of seven new regional governments and
eighteen hundred local ones, with boundaries determined by the practical
limits of how far police and fire-protection services can reach. The State
94. FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995).

95. Id.

96. Id
97. Id
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Legislature should admit its limitations and take this one step further by
empowering seven new regional local governments to oversee integrated
resource and performance standards and on-line price charts. These on-line
charts will identify where, when, and at what price development can occur
on geographic information system computer programs. Each region's
political will to fund its unique needs will differentiate the regions
dramatically.
Currently, regional planning councils, numerous large cities, and water
management districts all take part in development screening and permitting.
Solutions to problems that require a reach beyond their jurisdiction and
authority are breaking down old parochialism, personality bases, traditional
strongholds, and have some elected officials looking beyond their own next
re-election.
With phased and tiered development, one-stop permitting will be
possible. For example, a developer might be offered either more density
later, or expedited permitting immediately, for the first half of the
development if the developer waits for other resources to advance before
completing the development. Pinellas County already stops some
developments at fifty percent of their allowed use if a concurrency problem
arises in the annual concurrency test statement. Transition to development
rationing will require compensating transition victims who lose vested
rights. What a community is willing to pay, will drive its rationing and each
region's unique ration list and prices on-line for rationed entitlements.
In sum, "land use courts" must balance land use priorities against the
property rights that survive the rationing of remaining development rights.
Seven regional governments should govern most of what was once under
statewide control. The State Legislature and the new seven regional
counterparts will merge the power of local governments, water
management districts, and regional planning councils in the seamless web
of regulation by incentives and pricings. There will be a point system for
sensitive area impacts and performance standards and on-line price charts
for identifying at the click of a mouse where, when, and at what price each
residential or other type of development can occur.
The ticking time bomb of the infrastructure deficit, combined with the
Internet's development of an instantaneous capacity, will lead to a new way
of governing, but five or seven local elected officials will exercise
traditional discretion over the regional land use programs for approvals.

IX.

FINDING THE VISION

Planning is not the only way to preserve community values, and
planning beyond a community's resources may actually bring more harm
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than good to a community. Citizens in each community must acquaint
themselves with what is at stake in planning to fulfill the vision outlined in
the comprehensive plan. They must also be willing to fund and support that
vision. A community's comprehensive plan is more than a mere wish list.
It is an invoice for those services and policies the citizens will support as
their vision of the community. Along with the new regional governments,
will come new forms and sources of funding, to spread the costs of these
regional solutions over the appropriate base of new and existing users.
Development will go on in Florida. The question is how. Is the Growth
Management Act a ticking time bomb that will stunt Florida's economic
growth, or will it provoke discipline and force Florida's leaders to provide
new revenue sources and pricing ofrationed remaining facilities? Is growth
management in Florida a brilliant framework for making growth pay its own
way, or is it going to stop growth even by those who are willing to pay the
full share of their impact on facilities and resources (with full credits noted
above for their offsetting contributions)?
Over the next decade, new trends will emerge in land use disputes, their
causes, and their resolutions. Local governments will not be able to solve
certain problems with origins and cures beyond their jurisdictions. Seven
strong new regional governments will need to consolidate and greatly
expand the powers and responsibilities of the eleven existing, under-utilized
regional planning councils. The new regional governments will meet unique
needs within their given regions connected by culture, environment, and
infrastructure. Most importantly, unique needs will be met by each regional
government's political will to fund that region's unique points of
excellence, whether they be entertainment, converging technological
industries, agriculture, or service and light industries. The regional
governments will need to create new political boundaries and utilities such
as: (a) the Hillsborough, Pinellas and Pasco counties' new efforts to create
a Tampa Bay water utility on April 30, 1998; (b) the Tri-Rail in South
Florida; and (c) the Atlanta land use and transportation decision integration
regionally. In Cleveland, there are eight different regional governments of
three to eleven counties each attending to the protection of the river,
economic development, sports franchises, transportation integration, air
quality, and other needs. Water sources, major transportation, overall
planning, resource and capacity rationing, crime prevention, health care,
economic development, tourism, higher education, and regional
technological challenges and opportunities will be among the regional
problems which will require new means of dispute resolution. The regional
problems will also require a new wider scope of studies, solutions, and
integrated exactions and funding courage spread over the right new rate or
user base.
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X. CORRECTING FLORIDA'S VISION OVER THE NEXT DECADE

Fifteen years of experience with concurrency enforced comprehensive
planning (really phased in between 1989-1991) under the 1985 Growth
Management Act have taught us five lessons for the next decade in
developing a vision for Florida's future.
Lesson One: If the people of a community want to preserve its special
character, they must begin to participate now in creating a vision for their
community by pricing the remaining development rights, and participate in
local programs on how to get approvals and efficiently deliver services.
Lesson Two: Comprehensive plans must be understandable and
streamlined to bring into focus the goals that shape the community vision.
Lesson Three: Comprehensive plans should come with price tags. The
costs of planning must be clearly defined to assist citizens in making
informed choices about whether the costs of their visions are affordable and
whether they result in benefits to the community.
Lesson Four:Planning cannot be conducted in a vacuum. Planning must
occur within the boundaries of the constitutional property rights of
individual landowners despite the reprieve of the Supreme Court in the
1926 Euclid v. Amber Realty Co. decision.9
Lesson Five: Market forces must be acknowledged. Planning should
work in harmony with market forces rather than against them (by trying to
force people and businesses into places they do not want to be or will not
be welcomed). Anti-urban sprawl fads must be moderated by transportation
technology, real income increases, lifestyle demands, production and
telecommuting revolutions, potential tax incentives, and real prices for and
offsets against the costs for smarter infrastructure. Many planners promote
urbanization as a means to optimize utilization of government services and
promote cost-effective mass transit, but market demands for such urban
lifestyles must be groomed or adapted to evolving lifestyle choices.
Planners' pursuits of compact growth cannot succeed until it is backed by
a readiness to pay for its consequences, namely closely situated residential
and commercial development, higher densities, more multi-family dwellings,
and smaller lots for single-family dwellings.

98. Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

